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(57) ABSTRACT
The present disclosure includes methods and systems for
measuring the integrity of a device. A number of embodi-
ments can include initiating an observatory in a system and
initiating a remote manager. A number of embodiments can
also include measuring the integrity of the device from the
observatory and accessing the integrity measurement of the
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DYNAMICALLY MEASURING THE
INTEGRITY OF A COMPUTING APPARATUS
GOVERNMENT RIGHTS
This invention was made with Government support under
Agreement FAS750-10-D-0197 awarded by the Air Force,
Agreement W31P4QI3C0I43 awarded by DARPA and the
Army, and Agreement NNX15CL71P awarded by NASA.
Accordingly, the U.S. Government has certain rights in this
invention.
BACKGROUND
Computing systems can be exposed to a number of
security issues and other threats such as radiation-induced
faults in space-based systems. For example, a system can be
exposed to malware, among various other security threats.
Security threats may occur knowingly or unknowingly and
can occur from within a particular system or remotely. As an
example, malware can affect (e.g., harm) computational
operations and/or can provide access to sensitive informa-
tion, which can create various issues for companies and/or
users. Malware can reproduce itself and can spread from one
computer system to a number of other computer systems.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
FIG. 1 illustrates a functional block diagram associated
with measuring the integrity of a system in accordance with
a number of embodiments of the present disclosure.
FIG. 2 illustrates a system for measuring the integrity of
a device in accordance with a number of embodiments of the
present disclosure.
FIG. 3 illustrates a system for measuring the integrity of
a device in accordance with a number of embodiments of the
present disclosure.
FIG. 4 illustrates a number of systems for measuring the
integrity of a number of devices in accordance with a
number of embodiments of the present disclosure.
FIG. 5 illustrates a functional block diagram of an
example of measuring the integrity of a device in accordance
with a number of embodiments of the present disclosure.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
The present disclosure includes methods and systems for
measuring the integrity of a device. A number of embodi-
ments can include initiating an observatory in a system. A
number of embodiments can also include initiating a remote
manager. A number of embodiments can also include mea-
suring the integrity of a device from the observatory and
accessing the integrity measurement of the device from the
remote manager.
A number of embodiments can include instructions stored
on a computer-readable medium which are executed by a
processor to determine the integrity of a computing appa-
ratus as described herein. As an example, instructions stored
on a computer-readable medium can be executed by a
processor to initiate an observatory in a system. Instructions
stored on a computer-readable medium can be executed by
a processor to measure the integrity of a number of devices
from the observatory. Instructions stored on a computer-
readable medium can also be executed by a processor to
determine an integrity level of a computing apparatus based
on the measured integrity of the number of devices. A
number of embodiments can provide benefits such as sepa-
2
rating an integrity measurement associated with a particular
device from an observatory platform from which the integ-
rity is measured. Furthermore, a number of embodiments
can provide an infrastructure that can allow multiple integ-
5 rity measurements of a device to be made from a number of
different observatories. Measuring the integrity of the com-
puting apparatus from a number of different observatories
provides benefits such as the ability to compare the different
measurements, which can enhance a trust level associated
io with the integrity level of the computing apparatus. As used
herein, the term "computing apparatus" may refer to a
device and/or system. A device may refer to a component of
a system. A system may refer to a computing system.
In previous approaches, monitors are executed as pro-
15 grams co-located on a host's processor. Co-location
describes the measurement of the integrity of a device from
or by the device itself. Co-locating provides the monitor
with access to a variety of data sources. With adequate
privileges, a system's state can be accessed. However,
20 co-location may leave the monitor open to subversion from
security threats on the system. If, for example, a basic
input/output system (BIOS) is breached by malware, then
measuring the integrity of the BIOS by the BIOS may
provide incorrect measurements to the monitor.
25 An integrity level of a computing system can be deter-
mined based on a number of integrity measurements of its
devices. As used herein, a measurement can describe the
application of a stimulus to a device and the reading of the
response that the stimulus causes in the device. For example,
3o a memory device can be measured by activating a number of
sense lines and/or access lines to apply a stimulus and
reading data stored in the memory. As such, measuring a
memory device can include reading data stored in the
memory device. In a number of examples, the observatory
35 provides the stimulus to the device such that the device does
not measure itself even though the device's circuitry may be
used to produce a response.
Integrity can be measured by comparing the state of a
device and/or system to the expected state of that device
4o and/or system. Differences identified in that comparison can
indicate a change in the integrity of that device and/or
system. The integrity level of a device and/or system can
describe a degree to which a device and/or system has been
compromised by faults or security issues, for instance. As
45 used herein, the integrity level of a device and/or system
describes the integrity level of hardware, software, and/or
firmware that is associated with the device and/or system.
The integrity level of a device and/or system can also
indicate that different portions of the device and/or system
5o are (or are not) functioning properly. The integrity level of
a device and/or system also provides an indication regarding
the trust of the integrity measurements associated with a
device. As used herein, the integrity level of a device and/or
system can refer to a qualitative and/or quantitative value
55 that provides an indication regarding the integrity of the
device and/or system. For example, the integrity level can be
indicated via an assigned qualitative value such as "trust-
worthy" or "untrustworthy" and/or via an assigned integrity
level of "high," "medium," "low," etc., which can provide an
60 indication regarding whether, and/or the degree to which, the
device and/or system can/should be trusted. In a number of
examples, the integrity level can be indicated via a numeri-
cal scale (e.g., 1 to 10, 1 to 100). Embodiments are not
limited to a particular type of integrity level indicator.
65 In the following detailed description of the present dis-
closure, reference is made to the accompanying drawings
that form a part hereof, and in which are shown by way of
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illustration how a number of embodiments of the disclosure
may be practiced. These embodiments are described in
sufficient detail to enable those of ordinary skill in the art to
practice the embodiments of this disclosure, and it is to be
understood that other embodiments may be utilized and that
process, electrical, and/or structural changes may be made
without departing from the scope of the present disclosure.
The figures herein follow a numbering convention in
which the first digit or digits correspond to the drawing
figure number and the remaining digits identify an element
or component in the drawing. Similar elements or compo-
nents between different figures may be identified by the use
of similar digits. For example, 102 may reference element
"02" in FIG. 1, and a similar element may be referenced as
202 in FIG. 2. As will be appreciated, elements shown in the
various embodiments herein can be added, exchanged, and/
or eliminated so as to provide a number of additional
embodiments of the present disclosure. In addition, the
proportion and the relative scale of the elements provided in
the figures are intended to illustrate the embodiments of the
present invention, and should not be taken in a limiting
sense. Also, as used herein "a number of something can
refer to one or more of such things.
Various embodiments of the present disclosure can be
performed by execution of computer-readable instructions
(CRI) (e.g., in the form of software and/or firmware),
hardware, application modules, and the like, executable
and/or resident on the tools, systems, and devices shown
herein or otherwise. As used herein, a device refers to a
component of a computing system that can include CRI,
hardware, and/or application modules that can be targeted by
malware. An observatory refers to CRI, hardware, and/or
application modules executing on a device that can host CRI
that can measure the integrity of a number of devices in a
system. In a number of examples, an observatory and a
device can be independent from each other and can reside in
a same system (e.g., computer system). That is, CRI hosted
on the observatory can measure the integrity of the number
of devices without depending on the number of devices to
perform the measurement.
Independence can include one or more of temporal,
logical, and/or physical separations. A physical separation
can include one or more of electrical, mechanical, and/or
spatial separations. An example of temporal separation can
occur when a specific device acts as an observatory to
perform measurements on the number of devices, where
those devices may be temporarily frozen, halted, and/or
suspended, while the measurement occurs. An example of
logical separation can occur when an observatory on a
computing system is protected by features of the computing
system underlying the part of the system being measured. An
example of this is using a Trusted Execution Environment
provided by a processor from which to perform the mea-
surements. Physical separation can include physical separa-
tion between the observatory and the number of devices
being measured. Physical separation can include one or
more of spatial separation (e.g., physically distinct circuits
in separate devices), mechanical separation (e.g., where the
physically distinct circuits are on separate boards or separate
systems), and/or electrical separation (e.g., where the physi-
cal distinct systems do not share electrical power or signals).
In a number of examples, an electrical separation can
include an observatory that is powered by a first power
supply while a device that is being measured by the obser-
vatory is powered by a second power supply.
In a number of examples, the integrity level of a com-
puting apparatus can be measured at an initial state of a
_►,
system. For example, an integrity level of a computing
apparatus can be measured subsequent to booting of a
system (e.g., at and/or during boot time of a system).
Integrity measurements of a state of a device provide
5 knowledge of the integrity level of the computing apparatus
at a time of measurement (e.g., boot time, for instance). As
used herein, computing systems are dynamic systems that
change states in association with the passage of time. As a
result, the knowledge of the integrity level of a computing
10 
apparatus decays after an initial integrity of a system is
measured. The rate of decay of the knowledge of the
integrity level of a computing apparatus is proportional to
the rate of unpredictable change of states of the system.
15 The rate at which information is lost is referred to as an
entropic drag. In view of the entropic drag of a system, a
measurement of a state of a system can be taken dynami-
cally. Dynamic measurements of a state of a system can
describe the measuring of a state of a system after an initial
20 measurement of a state of a system is taken. Dynamic
measurements can be taken at predefined intervals and/or
based on one or more predefined events. Dynamic measure-
ment of the integrity level of a computing apparatus in
combination with the separation of the integrity measure-
25 ments from the observatory platforms can provide accurate
integrity measurements that are available after a system has
experienced security issues such as successful malware
attacks and/or failures.
FIG. 1 illustrates a functional block diagram associated
30 with measuring the integrity of a system in accordance with
a number of embodiments of the present disclosure. In the
example shown in FIG. 1, a number of integrity measure-
ments 106 of a target device 162 to be measured can be taken
from observatory platforms 104. The measurements made
35 by the observatory platforms can be retrieved by a remote
manager 102 and can be used to measure the integrity of the
system.
FIG. 1 shows a distinction between device 162 to be
measured, the integrity measurements 106, the observatory
40 platforms 104, and a remote manager 102 (e.g., remote
system) that provides commands and controls the measuring
of the integrity of a device 162. In a number of examples, a
measurement of the integrity of a device 162 may be taken
from a single observatory or a plurality of observatories.
45 Measuring the integrity of a device from a number of
observatories (e.g., a number of vantage points) can provide
sufficient information to attest to the integrity level of a
computing apparatus. As used herein, attesting the integrity
level of a computing apparatus refers to validating the
50 integrity of a computing apparatus. Each measurement of
the integrity of a device taken from a particular observatory
can be associated with a level of uncertainty. Uncertainty in
individual measurements can be attributed to the attack
surface that each of the observatories can have to security
55 threats. That is, each of the observatories may have suffered
a successful attack and/or may have experienced failures
which can affect the measurements of the integrity of a
device. The uncertainty of combined measurements taken
from a number of observatories decreases as the number of
60 measurements taken from a number of observatories
increases due to the ability to cross-check the number of
measurements.
FIGS. 2 and 3 provide examples of measuring 106 the
integrity of a device from a number of observation platforms
65 104. FIG. 2 shows a number of observation platforms (e.g.,
referred to generally as observatories). FIG. 3 shows a
number of devices that can be measured.
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FIG. 2 illustrates a system 220 for measuring the integrity
of a device in accordance with a number of embodiments of
the present disclosure. The system 220 can include a CPU
230 with a number of processor cores, a platform controller
hub 234, a memory 238, a direct memory access (DMA) 5
module 240, storage device 244, flash 254, and an I/O
module 252. The flash 254 can include a basic input/output
system (BIOS), unified extensible firmware interface
(UEFI), a management engine (ME), among other engines
and/or modules that can be flashed into system 220. The l0
system 220 also includes observatories 228-1, 228-2, 228-3,
228-4, 228-5, 228-6, 228-7, 228-8, and 228-9.
The system 200 can host an operating system (OS) (e.g.,
observatory 228-1) and/or an application 224 that can utilize 15
a number of devices that comprise the system 220. In a
number of examples, the system 220 can host a hypervisor,
virtual machine, and/or application 224. As used in FIG. 2,
memory 238 includes at least one of persistent memory,
non-persistent memory, physical memory, virtual memory, 20
internal memory, and/or external memory. Measuring the
integrity of memory 238 can include measuring the integrity
of the data stored in memory. For example, memory 238 can
include an application 224 stored in memory and/or an
operating system stored in memory. 25
The system 220 can be coupled to a remote manager 202
that can receive and/or retrieve a measurement of the integ-
rity of a number of devices. A description of the devices that
are measured is provided in FIG. 3.
A remote manager 202 is shown to be external and 30
independent of system 220. In a number of examples, the
remote manager 202 can be local to system 220. That is, the
remote manager 202 can be integrated into system 220. A
remote manager 202 that is independent of system 220 can
provide added security by being on a different system that 35
system 220 which may have security issues.
In FIG. 2, the observatories can include an OS (e.g.,
observatory 228-1), a TEE module (e.g., observatory 228-2),
a Graphics Processing Unit (GPU) (e.g., observatory 228-3),
a core in CPU 230 (e.g., observatory 228-4), a baseboard 40
management controller (BMC) (e.g., observatory 228-5), a
network interface card (NIC) (e.g., observatory 228-6), a
management engine (ME) (e.g., observatory 228-7), a
trusted platform module (TPM) (e.g., observatory 228-8),
and/or a storage controller 228-9 among other possible 45
observatories. The OS 228-1, the TEE module 228-2, the
GPU 228-3, the core 228-4, the BMC 228-5, the NIC 228-6,
the ME 228-7, the TPM 228-8, and/or the storage controller
228-9 can be referred to herein as observatories 228. In a
number of examples, the observatories 228 can also include 50
an integrated debug framework that can be integrated into a
processing resource. The observatories 228 can be instru-
mented and/or repurposed to measure the integrity of a
number of devices. The observatories 228 can have
resources (e.g., memory, processing resource) and/or can 55
have access to other devices resources that can enable the
observatories 228 to measure aspects of a number of devices
in system 220.
Instrumenting an observatory can include adding a num-
ber of CRI to already existing CRI. For example, the OS 60
228-1 can be instrumented by adding CRI to the OS 228-1
that provide the OS 228-1 with the ability to measure the
integrity of a device. The OS can monitor data structures for
unintended and/or unauthorized changes to measure the
integrity of a device, for example. A benefit of instrumenting 65
the OS 228-1 to measure the integrity of a device is that the
OS 228-1 can have visibility into the entire system 220.
6
Furthermore, the source code of the OS 228-1 may be open
and it may be hardware independent. In a number of
examples, measuring the integrity of a device and determin-
ing an integrity level of a computing apparatus (e.g., system
220 and/or devices) can include comparing what the system
220 measures its own state to what an observatory(s) 228
determines is the internal state of the system 220. A com-
puting apparatus can include a number of systems each
including a number of devices as shown in FIG. 5.
The TEE module 228-2 can include microcode and/or
firmware that supports an environment for partitioning
memory, and executing signed instructions in a secure
environment. That is, the TEE module 228-2 can support
software and hardware trusted execution. The TEE module
228-2 can be instrumented and/or repurposed to measure the
integrity of device. Repurposing the observatories 228 can
include replacing a number of old instructions with a num-
ber of new instructions that provide the ability to measure
the integrity of a device. For example, the TEE module
228-2 can be repurposed by flashing in the number of new
instructions that provide the ability to initiate a trusted
execution environment and/or measure the integrity of a
device.
The GPU 228-3 can include a processor that is coupled to
the system 220 via a peripheral component interconnect
express (PCIe) or other device communication interface. In
a number of examples, the observatories 228 can access and
analyze internal devices of the system 220. For example, the
GPU 228-3 can utilize the DMA module 240 to access and
analyze the memory 238 to measure the integrity of a device.
The core 228-4 can be a core in processor 230. The core
228-4 can execute instructions to measure the integrity of a
device.
The BMC 228-5 is an independent hardware subsystem
that facilitates remote management. The BMC 228-5 can be
repurposed and/or augmented with additional functionality
to measure the integrity of the device. The BMC 228-5 can
also be repurposed to provide out-of-band command and
control and telemetry. The BMC 228-5 and/or other obser-
vatories can be repurposed by replacing an old image with
a new image that is flashed onto the BMC 228-5 and/or other
observatories. The new image can be created by dividing an
old image provided by the manufacturer into file types. The
file system archives can be identified and updated to build
the new image.
The NIC 228-6 is an network interface card that can be
internal to system 220 and/or external to system 220. The
NIC 228-6 can be repurposed and/or augmented with addi-
tional functionality to measure the integrity of a device.
The ME 228-7 can include hardware and/or firmware for
remote out-of-band management of the device 220. The ME
228-7 can be repurposed and/or augmented with additional
functionality to measure the integrity of a device.
The TPM 228-8 is a dedicated microprocessor designed to
secure hardware by integrating cryptographic keys into a
device. The TPM 228-8 can be repurposed and/or aug-
mented with additional functionality to measure the integrity
of a device.
The storage controller 228-9 can include a firmware
and/or hardware that interfaces with storage devices 224 to
couple the storage device 224 to the system 220. The storage
controller 228-9 can also be repurposed and/or augmented
with additional functionality to measure the integrity of a
device.
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The new image can be flashed by using the manufactur-
er's firmware update tools to install the new image. In a
number of examples, the manufacturer's installer can be
used to load the new image.
FIG. 3 illustrates a system 320 for measuring the integrity
of a device in accordance with a number of embodiments of
the present disclosure. The system 320 includes a TEE 364
which is analogous to TEE 228-2 in FIG. 2. The TEE 364 in
FIG. 3 has a different reference number than the TEE 228-2
in FIG. 2 due to the different characteristics of the TEE that
are called out in FIG. 2 and in FIG. 3. For example, FIG. 2
describes the TEE 228-2 as an observatory. FIG. 3, describes
the TEE 364 as a device.
System 320 also includes a CPU 330, a platform control-
ler hub 334, an ME 336, a DMA 340, and a BMC 366, that
are analogous to the CPU 230, a platform controller hub 234,
ME 228-7, a DMA 240, and a BMC 228-5, in FIG. 2,
respectively. System 320 also includes a memory (e.g., a
device 362-1), a storage controller (a device 362-2), a
storage device (e.g., a device 362-3), flash (e.g., a device
362-4), a NIC (e.g., a device 362-5), an application (e.g., a
device 362-6), an OS (e.g., a device 362-7), a GPU (362-8),
an I/O module (e.g., a device 362-9) (e.g., referred to as
devices 362), and/or TPM 362-10 that are analogous to a
memory 238, a storage controller 228-9, a storage device
244, a flash 254, a NIC 228-6, an application 224, a OS
228-1, a GPU 228-3, an I/O module 252, and/or TPM 228-8
in FIG. 2.
System 320 shows a plurality of devices. The designation
of devices 362 provides examples of devices that can be
measured. The designation of devices 362 does not limit the
applicability of the term device 362 to devices not shown in
FIG. 3 and/or to devices not designated as devices 362 in
FIG. 3. For example, the devices 362 can also include
peripheral component interconnect (PCI) devices and/or
universal serial bus (USB) devices.
In a number of examples, a device can function as a
device 362 at a first time and as an observatory at a second
time. A device is not a device 362 and an observatory at a
same time. An observatory is independent of a device 362.
A device 362 can be measured to determine the integrity of
the device 362 at a first time and the device 362 can be used
as an observatory to measure the integrity of a different
device at a second time.
The integrity of a device can be measured subsequent to
booting the device (e.g., boot time) and/or dynamically after
booting the device. The integrity measurements of devices
362 can be used to determine an integrity level of the
computing system 320.
Measuring the integrity of the devices 362 at boot time
can include connecting the remote manager 302 to the ME
336 and reading a hardware asset inventory that the ME 336
provides. The hardware asset inventory can include an
inventory of the devices that are included in system 320
and/or that are coupled to system 320. The hardware asset
inventory can be created at a commissioning of the system
320 and/or at a later time of operation of the system 320.
In a number of examples, if the hardware asset inventory
is consistent with the devices that are currently included in
the system 320 and/or that are coupled to system 320, then
a more detailed measurement of the integrity of the devices
362 can be performed. If the hardware asset inventory is
inconsistent with the devices that are currently included in
the system 320 and/or that are coupled to system 320, then
a more detailed measurement of the integrity of the device
362 can be halted for a later time.
8
In a number of examples, if the hardware asset inventory
is inconsistent with the devices that are currently included in
the system 320 and/or that are coupled to system 320, then
a more detailed measurement of the integrity of the device
5 362 can be performed. If the hardware asset inventory is
consistent with the devices that are currently included in the
system 320 and/or that are coupled to system 320, then a
more detailed measurement of the integrity of the device 362
can be performed at a later time upon which the hardware
io asset inventory becomes inconsistent with the devices that
are included in system 320 and/or that are coupled to system
320. The type of measurements included in the more
detailed measurement of the integrity of the devices 362 can
be dependent on whether the more detailed measurements
15 are executed if the hardware asset inventory is consistent or
inconsistent with the devices that are currently included in
the system 320 and/or that are coupled to system 320.
For example, a more detailed measurement of the integ-
rity of the devices 362 can include inspecting a boot module
20 362-4, the devices 362 details, and/or read only memorys
(ROMs) (e.g., Option ROMs). The more detailed measure-
ment of the integrity of the devices 362 can be performed by
performing an integrated drive electronics redirection (IDE-
R) boot over a network and serving a custom image to the
25 system 320. The custom image can be referred to as a
stage-1 boot image.
The stage-1 boot image can be used to measure the
integrity of the devices 362. The measurement functionality
of the stage-1 boot image can reside in the ME 336 and may
so not require a reboot or the extra time for the network load.
The stage-1 boot image can provide a flexible approach to
performing detailed boot-time inspection and mitigation of
identified issues.
A number of tools can be used to identify changes to the
35 flash 362-4 acting as a boot module. The identified changes
can include minor (e.g., single-bit) boot module configura-
tion changes.
The stagel-boot image can also be used to inspect device
option ROMs for PCI devices, GPU 362-8, and/or storage
4o device 362-3, among other devices. A hash of the ROM
contents can be stored into third party data stores (3PDS). If
unapproved changes are detected, then the device 362 can be
re-flashed to a previously approved state.
In a number of examples, a number of user configuration
45 parameters can be stored for all the ROMs used by devices
(e.g., driver controllers, ethernet, video, and/or sound cards,
among other devices). User configuration parameters can
also include areas of the boot module that are stored within
a first number of bits of physical memory. For example, the
50 user configuration parameters can include areas of the boot
module that are stored within the first 1024 Kb of physical
memory.
The stage-1 boot image also provides a platform from
which storage devices 362-3 can be inspected to measure the
55 integrity of the storage devices 362-3. In addition to detect-
ing unexpected media (e.g., new disks or USB thumb drives,
for example), the MBR and partitions on the storage device
362-3 can be measured. If the MBR has changed from a
previous authorized state without authorization, then the
60 MBR can be restored to an approved state before launching
into the encrypted OS.
The measurement of the integrity of devices 362 can be
protected by programming the ME to inhibit network traffic
to and/or from the system 320 from the build-in NIC 362-5.
65 The protection can prevent attacks over a network connec-
tion that could compromise the initial machine-level integ-
rity checks. Although the system 320 may be off the net-
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work, the remote manager 302 can communicate directly
with the ME, via the 3PDS on the system 320. The 3PDSs
can be non-volatile RAM (NVRAM) under the control of
the ME 336. The ME 336 and the 3PDS can be used as the
remote access trusted path during the measuring of the
integrity of devices 362 subsequent to booting the device
and/or dynamically after booting the device.
The remote manger 302 can retrieve the integrity mea-
surements stored in the 3PDS. The remote manager 302 can
also determine an integrity level of the computing apparatus
(e.g., system 320 and/or devices 362) based on the integrity
measurements of the device. If unacceptable hardware
changes are identified during the boot process, then manual
or automated remediation may be implemented that can
include restricting unacceptable devices, rewriting compro-
mised flash memories, and/or rewriting the disk images.
FIG. 4 illustrates a number of systems for measuring the
integrity of a number of devices in accordance with a
number of embodiments of the present disclosure. FIG. 4
includes systems 420-1 and 420-2. FIG. 4 also includes
memory (e.g., devices 462-1 and 462-5), OSs (e.g., devices
462-2 and 462-6), applications (e.g., devices 462-3 and
462-7), and I/O modules (e.g., devices 462-4 and 462-8)
which are analogous to memory 362-1, OS 362-7, applica-
tions 362-6, and I/O module 362-9 in FIG. 3. FIG. 4 also
includes cores 430-1 and 430-2, monitors 402-1 and 402-2,
and ME 436-1 and 436-2 which are analogous to core 330,
manager 302, and ME 336 in FIG. 3.
The system 420-1 includes monitor 402-2, core 430-1,
ME 436-1, device 462-1, device 462-2, applications 462-3,
and device 462-4. System 420-2 includes monitor 402-1,
core 430-2, ME 436-1, device 462-5, device 462-6, device
462-7, and device 462-8.
A number of integrity measurements of a target device to
be measured can be taken from observatory platform. The
measurements can be stored in an ME. The measurements
can be retrieved by a remote manager and can be used to
measure the integrity of the system.
For example, an integrity measurement of devices 462-1,
462-2, 462-3, 462-4 can be taken from an observatory in
system 420-1. The measurements can be stored in ME
436-1. The measurements can be retrieved from ME 436-1
by monitor 402-2 which is external to system 420-1. An
integrity measurement of devices 462-5, 462-6, 462-7,
462-8 can be taken from an observatory in system 420-2.
The measurements can be stored in ME 436-2. The mea-
surements can be retrieved from ME 436-2 by monitor
402-1 which is external to system 420-2.
That is, the computing apparatus 490 comprises a number
of systems 420-1 and 420-2, with each hosting the remote
manager 402-1 and 402-2 that retrieves integrity measure-
ments from one of the other systems. The figure shows an
example with two systems, although more are possible.
System 420-1 hosts the remote manager 402-2 that retrieves
integrity measurements from system 420-2 and system
420-2 hosts the remote manager 402-1 that retrieves integ-
rity measurements from system 420-1. This configuration
enables the systems 420-1 and 420-2 to cross check each
other in identifying and addressing security issues, threats,
and/or failures.
FIG. 5 illustrates a functional block diagram of an
example of measuring the integrity of a device in accordance
with a number of embodiments of the present disclosure.
FIG. 5 includes a system 520, a hook 580, an operating
system (OS) 582, an observatory 528, a core 584, an ME
536, a TPM 548, and/or a RM 502. FIG. 5 provides an
example of dynamically measuring the integrity of a device
and determining an integrity level of a computing apparatus.
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The measuring of the integrity of a device is referred to as
dynamic in FIG. 5 as a result of being performed after the
booting of the device.
As used herein, a computing engine can include hardware
5 firmware, logic, and/or executable instructions, but includes
at least hardware (e.g., a processor, transistor logic, appli-
cation specific integrated circuit (ASIC), etc.) executing
instructions to perform particular actions, tasks and f mc-
tions described in more detail herein. For example, a com-
pute engine can include at least an initiation engine, a
measuring engine, a determination engine, a remote man-
ager engine, and a privileges engine.
Dynamically measuring the integrity of a device can
15 include enabling a single core 584 and disabling other cores
and disabling a DMA to reduce the available attack surface
to malware. In a number of examples, dynamically measur-
ing the integrity of a device can include halting the system
520 to limit the options for malware to interfere with the
20 outcome of the measuring process.
Dynamically measuring the integrity of a device can
include initiating at least one observatory to measure the
integrity of the device. The measuring can be initiated via an
initiation engine. The initiation engine can be a hook, for
25 example. A hook describes instructions that are included
and/or associated with an application, an operating system
582, firmware, and/or hardware, such as a timer, and that
initiate the measuring of the integrity of a device and/or
system. For example, the hook can be implemented in any
so of the observatories 228 in FIG. 2. The hook can initiate the
measuring by initiating an observatory 428. The hook can
initiate the measuring based on a predetermined time inter-
val. For example, the hook can initiate the measuring at
sub-second, seconds, minutes, or hourly time intervals,
35 among other possible time intervals. The hook can initiate
measuring the device based on the occurrence of an event
such as the reception of network traffic. The hook can also
initiate measuring the device based on different events that
can be associated with the possibility of a security threat.
4o The hook can also initiate measuring the device based on
different events that can be associated with the need to assess
integrity, (e.g., before launching a critical application).
The hook 580 can be implemented using a root access
and/or super user access in the OS 582 to invoke and/or
45 initiate an observatory 528. For example, the hook 580 can
invoke the TEE module, a GPU, a boot module, and/or a
different observatory. A privileges engine can provide a
number of privileges to observatory 528 (e.g., a number of
observatories) to measure the integrity of the device.
5o Although FIG. 5 shows a single observatory 528, a number
of observatories can provide a number of instructions that
measure the integrity of the device.
The observatory 528 can initiate a trusted execution
environment. For example, the TEE module can initiate a
55 trusted execution environment. Initiating a trusted execution
environment can include stopping the processors, the inter-
rupt handlers, and/or deactivating direct memory access.
Deactivating direct memory access can include preventing
periphery devices from accessing memory. In a number of
60 examples, all the processors can be deactivated and core
processor 584 can be activated or all the processors can be
deactivated with the exception of the core processor 584.
The observatory 528 can provide a set of instructions that
measure the integrity of the device to the TPM 548 to
65 determine whether the set of instructions that measure the
integrity of the device and/or system 528 have been modi-
fied without authorization. The instructions can be modified
US 10,025,925 B2
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without authorization if a security threat has altered the
instructions. The TPM 548 can perform a cryptographic
check to determine whether the set of instructions have been
modified without authorization.
If the set of instructions have not been modified without
authorization, then a measuring engine can initiate execution
of the instructions that measure the integrity of the device
via a core processor 584. In a number of examples, the
measuring engine can initiate execution of the instructions
that measure the integrity of the device via a non-core
processor such as the GPU.
The executed instructions that measure the integrity of the
device can analyze and/or measure physical memory, reg-
isters, and/or devices, among other devices that can be
analyzed. The observatory 528, via the core processor, 584
can bundle the integrity measurements of the device in a
package. The observatory 528 can cryptographically sign
the package. The observatory 528 can cryptographically
sign the package using the TPM 548, for example. Crypto-
graphically signing the results of the integrity measurement
using the TPM 548 can provide confidence to the remote
manager 502 that the results have not been altered by
malware.
The observatory 528 can place the cryptographically
signed package including the integrity measurements of the
device into the 3PDS 584. The 3PDS 584 can be flash
memory in the system 580. After the cryptographically
signed package is stored in the 3PDS 584, then the obser-
vatory 528 can allow the system 520 to return to a previous
state of execution that is not associated with measuring the
integrity of the device.
A remote manager engine can retrieve the results of the
measurement from the 3PDS 584 via the ME 536. The
remote manager engine can utilize the remote manager 502
retrieve and/or receive the results of the measurement. A
determination engine can determine, via the remote manager
502, whether the results of the measurement have been
altered by malware by inspecting the cryptographic signa-
ture associated with the results of the measurement. Inde-
pendent of the results of the measurement, the cryptographic
signature can be used to determine an integrity level of the
computing apparatus.
For example, if the cryptographic signature is not an
expected cryptographic signature, then the remote manager
502 can determine that a security threat exists in system 520.
If the results of the integrity measurements are deleted
and/or not present, then the remote manager 502 can deter-
mine that a security threat exists in system 520. For example,
malware may have tampered with the results of the mea-
surements and/or the measurement did not take place due to
unauthorized changes to system 520. If the results of the
measurement are saved to the 3PDS 584 and the crypto-
graphic signature is as expected, then the integrity measure-
ment of the device can be augmented.
A determination engine, via remote manager 502, can
utilize the integrity measurements of the device(s) to deter-
mine an integrity level of the computing apparatus. That is,
a number of integrity measurements of a single device can
be used to determine an integrity level of the computing
apparatus and/or a number of integrity measurements of a
number of devices can be used to determine an integrity
level of the computing apparatus.
CONCLUSION
The present disclosure includes methods and systems for
measuring the integrity of a device and/or system. A number
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of embodiments can include a number of observatories that
can measure the integrity of a device in a trusted execution
environment. A number of embodiments can also include a
remote manager that can retrieve the measurements and
5 determine an integrity level of a computing apparatus based
on the measurements of the integrity of the device.
It will be understood that when an element is referred to
as being "on," "connected to" or "coupled with" another
element, it can be directly on, connected, or coupled with the
io other element or intervening elements may be present. In
contrast, when an element is referred to as being "directly
on," "directly connected to" or "directly coupled with'
another element, there are no intervening elements or layers
present. As used herein, the term "and/or" includes any and
15 all combinations of a number of associated listed items.
It will be understood that, although the terms first, second,
etc. may be used herein to describe various elements and that
these elements should not be limited by these terms. These
terms are only used to distinguish one element from another
20 element. Thus, a first element could be termed a second
element without departing from the teachings of the present
disclosure.
Although specific embodiments have been illustrated and
described herein, those of ordinary skill in the art will
25 appreciate that an arrangement calculated to achieve the
same results can be substituted for the specific embodiments
shown. This disclosure is intended to cover adaptations or
variations of a number of embodiments of the present
disclosure. It is to be understood that the above description
3o has been made in an illustrative fashion, and not a restrictive
one.
Combination of the above embodiments, and other
embodiments not specifically described herein will be appar-
ent to those of skill in the art upon reviewing the above
35 description. The scope of the number of embodiments of the
present disclosure includes other applications in which the
above structures and methods are used. Therefore, the scope
of the number of embodiments of the present disclosure
should be determined with reference to the appended claims,
4o along with the full range of equivalents to which such claims
are entitled.
In the foregoing Detailed Description, some features are
grouped together in a single embodiment for the purpose of
streamlining the disclosure. This method of disclosure is not
45 to be interpreted as reflecting an intention that the disclosed
embodiments of the present disclosure have to use more
features than are expressly recited in each claim.
Rather, as the following claims reflect, inventive subject
matter lies in less than all features of a single disclosed
50 embodiment. Thus, the following claims are hereby incor-
porated into the Detailed Description, with each claim
standing on its own as a separate embodiment.
What is claimed is:
55 1. A computer implemented method for measuring an
integrity level of a computing apparatus, the method com-
prising:
initiating an observatory in a first component of the
computing apparatus, wherein the computing apparatus
60 comprises a plurality of components;
initiating a remote manager external to the plurality of
components;
obtaining an integrity measurement of a different compo-
nent of the computing apparatus from the initiated
65 observatory; and
accessing the integrity measurement of the different com-
ponent from the remote manager; and
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wherein initiating the observatory in the first component
comprises repurposing the first component to serve as
the observatory in addition to a primary purpose of the
first component.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the initiated observa-
tory measures the integrity of the different component
without depending on the different component to perform
the measurement itself.
3. The method of claim 1, further comprising instrument-
ing the observatory by adding a number of instructions to
already existing instructions stored in the observatory such
that the observatory can obtain integrity measurements of
components other than the different component.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein the first component in
which the observatory is executed and the different compo-
nent are physically separate components in the computing
apparatus.
5. The method of claim 1, wherein each of the plurality of
integrity measurements accessed from the remote manager
has an associated level of uncertainty determined based on
an attack surface to security threats.
6. The method of claim 1, wherein the integrity measure-
ment is one of a plurality of integrity measurements
accessed from the remote manager, the plurality of integrity
measurements including at least two integrity measurements
of a particular component of the computing apparatus taken
from observatories initiated in at least two components of
the computing apparatus other than the particular compo-
nent; and
wherein the plurality of integrity measurements accessed
from the remote manager are used to determine an
integrity level for the computing apparatus.
7. A computer-readable medium having instructions
stored thereon that are executed by a processor to:
initiate an observatory in a number of components of a
computing apparatus comprising a plurality of compo-
nents;
initiate a trusted execution environment of the computing
apparatus;
perform, from a first initiated observatory within the
computing apparatus, an integrity measurement of at
least one of the plurality of components;
perform, from a second initiated observatory within the
computing apparatus, an integrity measurement of the
at least one of the plurality of components; and
determine an integrity level of the computing apparatus
based on the integrity measurements of the at least one
of the plurality of components; and
wherein initiating the observatory in the number of com-
ponents comprises repurposing the number of compo-
nents to serve as the observatory in addition to a
primary purpose of the number of components.
8. The computer-readable medium of claim 7, including
instructions executable to:
determine that a problem exists based on the integrity
level of the computing apparatus; and
resolve the problem.
9. The computer-readable medium of claim 8, wherein the
integrity measurements of the at least one of the plurality of
components are stored in a third party data store to be
retrieved by a remote manager.
10. The computer readable-medium of claim 8, including
instructions executable to:
retrieve the integrity measurements of the at least one of
the plurality of components; and
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verify a cryptographic signature associated with the integ-
rity measurements of the at least one of the plurality of
components.
11. The computer-readable medium of claim 7, wherein at
5 least one of the first and second initiated observatories is at
least one of a board management controller, an operating
system (OS), a graphics processing unit (GPU), a trusted
platform module, and a boot module.
12. The computer-readable medium of claim 7, wherein
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the at least one of the plurality of components is at least one
of a storage controller, a device controller, a device con-
nected through a controller, a storage media, a memory, and
an OS.
13. The computer-readable medium of claim 7, wherein
initiating the trusted execution environment includes deac-
15 tivating:
several processors;
an interrupt handler; and
direct memory access.
14. A system for determining an integrity level of a
20 computing apparatus, comprising:
an initiation engine to:
initiate an observatory in each component of a group of
components of a computing apparatus;
initiate a trusted execution environment of the comput-
25 ing apparatus;
wherein initiating the observatory in each component
of the group of components comprises repurposing
each component of the group of components to serve
as the observatory in addition to a primary purpose
30 of each component of the group of components;
a measuring engine to provide, from a plurality of the
initiated observatories, a respective plurality of integ-
rity measurements of a particular component of the
computing apparatus, wherein each one of the plurality
35 of integrity measurements has an associated uncer-
tainty level; and
a determination engine to determine an integrity level of
the computing apparatus based on the plurality of
integrity measurements of the particular component
40 taken from the plurality of initiated observatories and
their associated uncertainty levels.
15. The system of claim 14, further comprising a man-
agement engine to monitor the computing apparatus and
access the plurality of integrity measurements.
45 16. The system of claim 15, wherein the management
engine is executed on the computing apparatus that the
management engine is monitoring.
17. The system of claim 15, wherein the management
engine is executed on a different computing apparatus that is
50 being measured by a number of different observatories in the
different computing apparatus.
18. The system of claim 14, wherein the integrity level of
the computing apparatus is based on a comparison of the
plurality of integrity measurements of the particular com-
55 ponent cross-checked against each other, and wherein the
uncertainty levels corresponding to the respective plurality
of integrity measurements are based, at least partially, on an
attack surface to security threats of the initiated observato-
ries.
60 19. The system of claim 14, wherein the initiation engine
is configured to initiate an observatory in each one of:
a core of a processor;
a memory device coupled to the processor; and
a network interface card.
